

Introduction 介紹

In the decades following the defeat of Hannibal in 202 BC, various conflicts took Roman armies far and wide around the Mediterranean. The siege warfare that they practised largely took the form of the storming assault. but Rome's acquaintance with Macedon, as both adversary and ally, perhaps opened the eyes of her generals to the possibilities of more sophisticated tactics. P. Sulpicius Galba, attempting to raise Philip V's siege of Echinus in 210 BC, could not have failed to have been impressed by the Macedonian siege train.¹ Twenty years later, M'. Acilius Glabrio deployed substantially the same kind of machinery outside the Greek town of Heraclea. For 24 days, his men persevered with 'siege towers, battering rams, and all the other equipment for besieging a town' (Livy 36.22.9), before they were finally unleashed in a terrifying escalade.

在西元前 202 年，於打敗漢尼拔後的十年間，許多戰鬥使羅馬軍隊大規模的征戰於地中海各地。他們進行大規模的圍城戰役形成一種風暴般的攻擊，但在羅馬人取得了馬其頓之下，對於其對手及盟友，也許打開了他們的眼界於更複雜戰術的可行性。P.索匹西斯 高巴，在西元前 210 年曾嘗試圍攻飛利浦五世的艾曲努斯城，如果他經歷過馬其頓的圍城歷練，便不會在此戰爭中失敗。20 年後，M.艾希留斯 蓋賴貝歐在希臘的赫拉克利亞城鎮外部屬了實質上相同的機器。在 24 天內，他的士兵們堅持不懈的應用圍城塔、攻城槌以及各種圍城器具，最後終於在可怕的城牆攀登下解脫。

Circumstances had not changed by the time of the fall of Carthage, half a century later. The surest tactic for capturing fortified positions remained the storming assault, which Roman armies appear to have conducted with particular ferocity. The increasingly common employment of machinery did not guarantee success, a fact that perhaps indicates a general absence of artillery to provide covering fire. In 148 BC, for example, at Hippagreta near Carthage, L. Calpurnius Piso is said to have spent all summer attempting to break into the town, but the defenders persisted in burning his siege machines (App., *Pun.* 110). Wooden machinery was always² susceptible to burning; this is a theme that all siegecraft writers return to, again and again. However, in later ages, artillery and missile troops were deployed to provide the continuous bombardment which discouraged such incendiary attacks. At Hippagreta, Piso gave up, where a better general would perhaps have persevered.

半個世紀後，在迦太基城的失守時情勢並沒有改變，奪得強固據點最有把握的戰術依然是風暴式的攻擊，一如羅馬軍隊曾進行過相似的殘暴行為。日益普遍的機器運用並沒有保證成功，這事實也許表示著普遍缺乏火砲以進行掩護射擊。例如，在西元前 148 年，迦太基城附近的西帕蓋瑞塔城，L. 高普紐斯 披索 據說曾花了一整個夏天嘗試攻入城鎮，但防守者燒掉了它的圍城機器以存活下來(App., *Pun.* 110)。木製的機器總是容易被燃燒，這個話題總是一次又一次的被圍城戰役作家提起。然而，在幾年後，火砲以及導彈軍隊被部屬以提供持續的轟炸，此舉打擊了這類的縱火攻擊。在西帕蓋瑞塔城，披索放棄了，也許一個更有能力的將軍會堅持下去。

Events at Carthage neatly encapsulate Roman siegecraft of the period. The consuls of 149 BC, ignorant of the fact that the demilitarised city was actively re-arming, rashly assumed that she would easily fall to escalation. When several attempts failed, they settled down to construct siege machinery. Appian records the construction of ‘two enormous ram-carrying machines’ (App., *Pun.* 98), allegedly crewed by 6,000 men; their deployment required the consolidation of a pathway along the edge of the stagnant Lake of Tunis, which implies that they were targeted at the city’s south wall. The attempt was frustrated, however, when the defenders not only repaired any wall breaches that the Romans managed to make, but also crept out by night and set the machines ablaze. Nothing was achieved in this first year of the siege, and in the second the Romans concentrated on Carthage’s allies in the north African hinterland. In the third year, 147 BC, a mishandled escalation resulted in several thousand Romans being pinned down in an area just inside the city; they were extricated only by the timely arrival of Scipio Aemilianus, who was due to take up the command in 146.

迦太基城事件在當時幾乎蓋過了羅馬人圍城戰的光采。西元前 149 年的古羅馬執政官，對於解除武裝城市正積極重整軍備事實的無知，輕率地認為它受到攀城攻擊很容易失守。當幾次嘗試進攻失敗，他們開始建置圍城機器。阿皮安記載著”兩個巨大且帶有工程槌的機器”(App., *Pun.* 98)，據稱搭載著 6000 名士兵，他們的部屬需要一條沿著突尼斯停滯湖邊緣的穩固路徑，這暗示著他們曾攻擊這城市的南面圍牆。這個嘗試失敗了，然而，防守者不只修好了所有羅馬人破壞的圍牆，還在夜晚悄悄爬出城牆對這些機器縱火，在第一年的圍城戰中，沒有任何進展。在第二年，羅馬人專注於迦太基盟軍在北非內陸，第三年，西元前 147 年，雜亂的攀城行動造成幾千名羅馬士兵在城鎮的內部受到重挫，他們在西皮奧 艾米利艾努斯及時的抵達而獲救，他在 146 年接手軍隊的指揮。